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Coping with Change: The Need to
Restructure Urban Governance and
Finance in India1
M. Govinda Rao* and Richard M. Bird**
*National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi
**University of Toronto

Abstract
Over 330 million people live in India‘s 5,165 cities, with 35 cities having a population of
over a million. Three (Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata) of the 10 largest metropolises in the
world are in India. Over two-thirds of GDP originates in urban agglomerations in the
country. However, urban governance and finance in India leave much to be desired in
terms of providing services to the country‘s burgeoning urban population and with
respect to its flexibility in accommodating different needs and pressures and its lack of
resiliency in adapting to shocks, whether natural or manmade. This paper draws on
lessons from fiscal federalism theory and experiences of governance institutions and
financing systems around the world to identify some key reforms needed to ensure more
citizen participation and greater accountability in urban governance, and to augment and
strengthen the capacity of Indian cities to deliver more adequate services and provide
needed urban infrastructure.
Keywords: India; metropolitan areas; governance; finance
JEL: R5, H1, H7
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India‘s rapid economic expansion over the last few decades since the loosening of the socalled ―license raj‖—the constricting deadweight of licensing, regulation, and red tape
that had long held back private sector development—has been impressive. Moreover, the
country has managed to sustain a respectable performance in the face of such major
economic crises as the recent financial meltdown. India‘s private sector is clearly alive,
well, and capable of even better things in the future. Unfortunately, it is not so clear that
the country‘s expanding urban public sector is equally able to cope with the economic,
demographic, and environmental changes that continue to confront it. This paper
considers some aspects of the governance and finance reforms needed to make India‘s
burgeoning cities better places for those who live in them, for those who are going to
move into them in the future, and for the country as a whole. To cope adequately with the
changes that have already occurred, let alone those that loom ahead, India‘s cities need to
be freed from what might perhaps be called the ―urban raj‖—the archaic and wellentrenched institutional structure that restricts what they can do and provides few
incentives for them to do it well.
Section 1 of the paper outlines why turning India‘s cities into ―engines of growth‖
is a necessary ingredient of future growth, a feat that requires reforming and
strengthening local governance structures. Similarly, local finances must be strengthened
to provide adequate finance for the provision of services and to ensure that the money
spent results in desired outputs and outcomes. Section 2 sets out some important
preconditions for efficient governance systems and finance drawn from the theory of
fiscal federalism. Against this background, Section 3 outlines the present inadequate
urban governance structure in India, concluding that major efforts are needed to equip
India‘s cities with a governance structure capable of responding flexibly and adequately
to the changing realities they face. Section 4 discusses the problems arising from
ambiguity and overlap in expenditure assignment and weaknesses in public financial
management. The next three sections turn to the revenue side of the budget. Section 5
considers how to make local taxes and user charges more adequate to finance local public
services while ensuring efficiency and accountability. Section 6 considers the role of
transfers and suggests some reforms. Section 7 turns to the critical issue of infrastructure
finance through such means as local borrowing, development charges, land sales, or
public-private partnerships. Section 8 offers some concluding remarks.
1. The Need for Urban Dynamism
Cities are the leading edge of economic dynamism in every country. They create
agglomeration economies for enterprises, generating externalities that facilitate
transactions, production, and distribution activities. They also facilitate productive
interaction of people from various walks of life, resulting in the exchange of ideas and a
climate for creative activity that leads to both innovation and productivity gains. In
particular, large metropolitan areas provide scope to achieve the critical mass required to
attain high degrees of specialization in labour, knowledge and businesses, services,
infrastructure, institutions, and media, all of which increase economic dynamism and
growth (Bird and Slack 2007).
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However, the extent to which cities succeed in realizing these potentials depends
in large part on whether they provide a properly enabling environment. For example, to
give agglomeration economies full scope requires the sustained provision of a wide range
of urban public services that promote both private sector activities and the well-being of
the urban population, such as water, sewers, garbage collection and disposal, drainage
systems, police and fire protection, and transportation. To do this well requires good
policies and high-quality public institutions. Similarly, attracting the knowledge workers
needed to create and maintain a social environment that facilitates creative social and
economic interaction requires policies that accommodate diverse cultures (including
outsiders) as well as such quality of life factors as high-quality schools and health care
facilities, social and cultural activities, recreational opportunities, and safe and strong
neighbourhoods. Cities must accommodate not just such key workers, of course, but all
those who make the city work, including new migrants and others working in
construction and other essential activities who often need affordable housing and in
many cases some social assistance. Underlying all this, a ―good‖ city needs a political
and governance system that can respond to the changing requirements and needs of its
people swiftly, flexibly, and efficiently.
None of these conditions is easy to satisfy in India, a country in which over 330
million people live in 5,165 urban areas, which has 35 cities with over a million people,
as well as three of the largest metropolises in the world (Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata).
India‘s urban population has been growing at an annual rate of 2.7 per cent and, although
overall population growth is expected to decelerate, the urban population will continue to
grow at about 2.5 per cent over the next two decades (Ramanathan and Dasgupta 2009).
The urban sector presently contributes about two-thirds of GDP and this share is likely to
increase to 75 per cent by 2021 (India 2008). India‘s cities are thus many, large,
economically important, and growing. Ensuring that they will be able to meet the
challenges they face will not be easy.
Demands for better infrastructure and public services in India‘s urban areas are
large and growing. However, the resources available to urban local governments are
clearly inadequate to serve even their present population. For example, Mohanty et al.
(2007) found that, on average, for the period 1999–2000 to 2003–04 actual spending in
30 large municipal corporations2 in India was only about 24 per cent of the (inflationadjusted) requirements set almost a half a century ago by the Zakaria Committee (India
1963), with the extent of under-spending by this measure being over 75 per cent in 17
municipal corporations, and over 50 per cent in all of them but three—Pune, Nagpur, and
Nasik, where the deficit was only about 30–35 per cent. At the other extreme, spending in
the Patna Municipal Corporation was estimated to be less than 6 per cent of the Zakaria
norm, with other municipal corporations in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh almost equally badly
off. Recent analysis by the Planning Commission shows that 34 per cent of urban
households do not have water taps within their premises, 26 per cent of them do not have
toilets, 70 per cent of waste is not treated before disposal, and untreated sewerage and
unregulated discharge from industries is a major source of water pollution (India 2008).
In total, only 63 per cent of the urban population had access to sewerage and sanitation
2

According to India (2004), there are 96 municipal corporations, 1494 municipalities and 2092 Nagar
Panchayats ( usually in urban areas of 100,000 or less).
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facilities in 2004. Urban transportation problems are similarly acute. Public transportation
is congested and inefficient; even those who can afford private transportation on average
travel only one kilometre in 15 minutes owing to road congestion. Housing too is
problematic, with almost 21 per cent of the urban population living in squatter
settlements. Indian cities are in bad shape.
With urbanization proceeding at a fast pace, all these problems are likely to
worsen in the near future. Ramanathan and Dasgupta (2009) estimate the cumulative
capital investment requirements for providing services at 2007 prices for the period
2006–31 at over Rs.71 trillion. When operating expenditures of around Rs.10 trillion are
taken into account, the total expenditure required amounts to over Rs.3 trillion, or about
25 per cent of the consolidated revenue of central and state governments. Exponentially
growing urban public service requirements simply cannot be financed from the present
urban local tax base, which in most cases consists essentially of the property tax. At one
time, some states allowed municipal governments to levy a tax on the entry of goods into
a local area for consumption, use, or sale (octroi). Although this tax was distortionary and
inefficient, it provided a buoyant source of local revenues. Now, however, nearly all
states have abolished this tax. Indeed, a few states have gone even further to ensure the
inadequacy of urban local public finance by abolishing the residential property tax.
Elsewhere, urban local bodies have proved unable (or unwilling) to help themselves by
adequately revising property values, thus ensuring stagnancy or even decline in their own
revenues. Transfers from the states to municipal governments are of little help, because
they are inadequate and ad hoc and poorly designed. The absence of a debt market for
local government bonds makes financing infrastructure even more difficult. In the
absence of major reforms in both governance and finance, the prospects for Indian cities
do not look good
2. Lessons from Theory
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism, assuming a welfare-maximizing government,
demonstrates the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization by matching public service
provision with the varied preferences of people living in different jurisdictions. In one
formulation, people ―vote with their feet‖ by moving to localities providing public
service tax mixes that closely matches their preferences (Tiebout 1956). However, the
unrealistic nature of this assumption of mobility as well as the information asymmetry
relating to public services and tax mix in different localities limits the applicability of this
model to real world situations. An alternative formulation is the ―decentralization
theorem,‖ which states that ―… in the absence of cost savings from the centralized
provision of a (local public) good and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of
welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of
consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions‖ (Oates 1972, 54). The welfare gains
from decentralization are larger when variations in demand are greater and where the
demand for local services is relatively inelastic. The ability of a centralized system to
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cater to diverse preferences is limited by information asymmetry and political constraints
(Oates 1999).
The so-called second generation theories (SGT) of fiscal federalism assume that
agents within governments (bureaucrats and politicians) attempt to maximize their own
welfare function within a constellation of incentives and constraints shaped by the
characteristics of the prevailing fiscal and political institutions (Oates 2008). One SGT
approach applies industrial organization theories to fiscal federalism and analyses
multilevel fiscal arrangements in terms of the principal-agent framework (Seabright
1996). A second approach, motivated partly by the fiscal crisis in several Latin American
countries precipitated in part at least by an incentive structure that led to the excessive
exploitation of the ―fiscal commons‖ by subnational governments, applies Kornai‘s
(1986) ―soft budget constraint‖ (Rodden et al. 2003). A third SGT approach employs
more formal political economy approaches based, for example, on legislative structure
and electoral process to analyse different kinds of fiscal outcomes under centralized and
decentralized politics. For example, the outcomes emerging from so-called ―yardstick
competition‖ are analysed under the rubric of ―competitive federalism‖ by Breton (1996).
All these approaches are not intended to replace the traditional theory of fiscal federalism
but to complement and extend it.
An important precondition for efficient provision of public services is clarity in
the assignment of functions (expenditure responsibilities) to each level of government.
Who does what should depend upon the benefit span of the public service in question, the
extent of diversity in demand for the service, the technology available for its efficient
provision, and the capacity of the jurisdiction to provide the service. Functions need to be
clearly assigned to ensure responsiveness and accountability. In a democratic polity, the
elected executive should have the overall decision-making powers for public service
provision, and the role of the bureaucracy should be to implement the decisions taken by
the executive. Even when the basic assignment system is clear, however, some
overlapping is almost inevitable so it is important to establish clear institutional lines of
authority.
Assignment of financial powers should be adequate to finance the functions
assigned. Accountability of governments to local residents can best be achieved when the
residents of the jurisdiction bear the cost of providing the services at least at the margin.
Hence, local governments must have powers to raise revenues from the residents to
finance the public services consumed by them. Ensuring a strong ―Wicksellian‖ link
(Breton 1996) between revenue and expenditure decisions at the margin is critical to
ensure that urban governments take rational decisions and are accountable to the residents
for their decisions.
Local governments generally provide a mix of private and public goods. In
principle, user charges covering the cost of provision should be paid by those who benefit
directly from the private goods provided. Similarly, the cost of public services benefiting
the people in the jurisdiction as a whole should be collected from taxes on the residents.
On the other hand, when service benefits spill over to other jurisdictions, it is often
appropriate for them to be partly paid for through transfers. Local governments may
obviously levy taxes on immobile bases such as real property. In addition, the benefit
principle suggests that they may, to a limited extent, be permitted to impose taxes on
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mobile bases, although such powers must be bestowed with care to avoid encouraging
shifting the cost of local services to non-residents (Bird and Smart 2010).
Intergovernmental transfers play an important role in local public service
provision. In the traditional approach, higher-level governments should levy all broad
based redistributive taxes since they have a comparative advantage in carrying out
redistributive and stabilization functions. On the other hand, considerable expenditure
responsibility is properly assigned to lower-level governments for efficiency reasons. The
resulting vertical imbalance between expenditures and revenues at each level is generally
corrected through transfers from the higher to lower levels. Within each level of
subnational government, some jurisdictions will inevitably suffer some fiscal disability
owing to such factors as below average revenue capacity and higher unit costs of
providing public services. Differences in these factors create different net fiscal benefits
in different jurisdictions and may thus induce inefficient factor movements (Buchanan
1950). This problem may be exacerbated when subnational governments impose originbased taxes (Boadway and Flatters 1982). The solution to such inefficiencies is, again,
usually considered to reside in appropriate intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In principle,
such balance-restoring (or gap-closing) transfers are intended to enable every jurisdiction
to provide comparable levels of services at comparable tax rates should be unconditional
(Bird and Smart 2002). However, there is also often a case for providing specific purpose
transfers to ensure minimum standards of public services with significant interjurisdictional externalities. In this case, the appropriate transfer design should often
require the recipient governments to comply with specific conditions.
In practice, it is difficult to incorporate all these principles in designing the
transfer system. There is, for example, no completely objective way to measure the
degree of vertical or horizontal imbalance (Bird and Tarasov 2004). Similarly, with
respect to specific purpose transfers, it is impossible as a rule to measure the degree of
externalities and hence to develop optimal cost-sharing arrangements or matching ratios.
Since the economic argument for decentralization is based to some extent on asymmetric
information in terms of the inability of the central government to estimate the correct
degree of spillovers, it is somewhat ironic that the proper design of specific purpose
transfers requires exactly such information. As Inman (2003) shows for the U.S.,
matching ratios in practice never correspond to the extent of spillovers and the federal
share is invariably much higher than spillovers. Finally, even if all the conceptual and
empirical problems inherent in designing an economically optimal transfer system could
be overcome, invariably non-economic (including political) objectives creep in and
ensure that the actual transfer system differs from the ideal.
Moreover, some have even questioned whether intergovernmental transfers are a
good idea in any case. Transfers inevitably soften the budget constraint and have been
argued to undermine fiscal discipline and promote fiscal irresponsibility and
macroeconomic instability (Prud‘homme 1995). Equalising transfers given to offset fiscal
disadvantages can interfere with the normal process of income convergence which occurs
in the process of economic growth as labour and capital move from places with lower
productivity to those with higher productivity. Specific purpose transfers may not
effectively encourage local expenditures on the desired function owing to the fungibility
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of funds. For these and other reasons, transfers may harm rather than further the
achievement of efficiency and even equity goals.
Nonetheless, substantial transfers exist in every multilevel fiscal system. It is not
possible to perfectly match revenue powers with expenditure responsibilities, so an
appropriate design principle is for transfers to be neither so large as to turn local
governments into simple agents of higher-level governments or make them unduly
transfer-dependent and hence fiscally irresponsible, nor so small as to render them
incapable of providing minimal local services to their residents. One key way to set a
hard budget constraint is to ensure that richer local governments are as self-financing as
possible and that even the poorest local governments have sufficient revenue flexibility
so that revenue and expenditure decisions are matched at the margin in the sense that any
local decision to expand expenditure must be financed through additional local taxation
(Bird and Vaillancourt 1998). Further, both central and state governments must be careful
not to bail out bad local decisions by expanding transfers. The system of grants must be
transparent, predictable, and essentially ―infra-marginal‖ for any particular budgetary
period so that local governments do not have incentives to free-ride.
To satisfy the conditions of what Weingast (1995, 2009) calls ―market-preserving
federalism‖ (in the sense of maintaining an open national market), local governments
must face a hard budget constraint as a result of properly designed and implemented
expenditure and revenue systems. In addition, efforts must be made to strengthen and
deepen markets, particularly land and capital markets, by removing impediments to
mobility and trade in factors and products such as laws restricting markets and
institutional rigidities. Similarly, efficient credit and debt markets and a well-developed
banking system along with credible credit rating institutions are important preconditions
to avoid bail outs. If intergovernmental competition is to result in gains in terms of
efficient service delivery let alone and innovation and productivity gains, it is important
to institute proper checks against destabilizing (predatory) competition as well as against
restrictive and protectionist policies. All these issues become particularly important in the
context of globalization because localities with better linkage to markets and
infrastructure can reap higher benefits from access to domestic and international markets
and grow faster than those less well off in these respects. Finally, in case something goes
badly wrong in some locality it is also essential to develop institutions that can handle
local fiscal crises and even, in the extreme, bankruptcy. None of the tasks assigned to
policy makers by the fiscal federalism literature is easy and few, if any, are facilitated by
India‘s current structure of urban governance and finance.
3. Urban Governance in India
Economically dynamic cities need governance structures that elicit preferences for public
services, ensure responsiveness in the provision of such services, provide accessibility to
citizens, and achieve cost savings by adopting an appropriate scale of operation. Bird and
Slack (2007) discuss several alternative models for governing large metropolitan areas
and conclude that no unique model of governance fits all municipalities or even the same
municipality at different times. In fact, in recent years, a number of major cities have
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changed their governance model. Toronto (Canada) moved from a fragmented one-tier
structure to a two-tier structure and then to a consolidated single-tier structure. On the
other hand, London (UK) moved from a two-tier structure to a one-tier structure and then
back to a two-tier structure. Cape Town (South Africa) moved from having no metro
government at all to a two-tier and then a consolidated one-tier metropolitan structure.
What is right for any city is seldom clear, and may change over time. In larger
metropolitan areas, however, the real choice is usually between one-tier or two-tier
governance structures perhaps supplemented by some voluntary inter-municipal cooperative agreements or specialized agencies to provide particular public services.
An important governance issue in India concerns the need to distinguish large
metropolitan cities from smaller municipalities. In metropolitan cities, the concentration
of a variety of economic activities, the cosmopolitan composition of population, and
large-scale migration requires a system of public service provision that not only
facilitates economic activities but also promotes the social interaction and cohesion
necessary to facilitate innovation and impart dynamism. However, how large
metropolitan cities are actually governed may deviate substantially from this mandate in
response to the compulsions of local politics, especially when they are state capitals.
Restrictive protectionist policies responding to pressures to provide employment to local
population, preferences for local population in business dealings and contracts, and
preferences based on linguistic, ethnic, and other considerations may rob cities of their
metropolitan character. A possible way to free large cities from such state political
pressures may be remove them from the control of the state governments and create
separate city-states as China has done for several very large cities, most recently
Chongqing. Germany, for example, has three such city-states, including Berlin. Other
countries—the United States, Australia, Mexico, and Brazil, for example—have created
special capital city districts, as has India. However, as Indian experience with New Delhi
shows, being special and separate provides at best only a partial answer to the financial
and governance problems facing large, rapidly growing cities in India (Mathur 2009), so
we do not discuss such approaches further here.
Even within a one-tier structure, of course, governance in large cities is far from
simple. In Shanghai, for instance, there are three levels of management—municipal,
district, and sub-district. In Mumbai, which has been characterized as a ―fragmented onetier structure‖ (Slack 2007, 15), matters are more complicated. Mumbai has seven wards,
each with its own municipal officials, and the surrounding eastern and western suburbs
are also divided into wards. Within the Mumbai urban agglomeration, in addition to the
municipal corporations of Mumbai, Kalyan, and New Mumbai, there are many other
governing bodies, including the Mumbai Regional Development Authority, 16 municipal
towns, 7 non-municipal urban areas, and 995 villages. In addition, management of urban
services in Mumbai is divided further still among the Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai, the state of Maharashtra, and the Government of India. For example, the urban
rail network is run by Indian Railways.
In a two-tier model, the lower tier is responsible for providing services having
smaller geographical spread while the upper tier provides services with a larger
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geographical spread as well as those involving significant economies of scale. This model
has some characteristics that make it suitable for large metropolitan regions. Examples
may be found, for instance, in Madrid (Spain), Santiago (Chile), and Manila (Philippines).
Two-tier structures already exist in many Indian cities. For example, Hyderabad
Municipal Corporation has 11 municipalities, Chennai Municipal Corporation has 36
municipalities, and Kolkata has 41 municipalities within its area (Bandyopadhyay and
Rao 2009). In principle, the two-tier model may have potential advantages over the onetier model owing to its greater responsiveness, efficiency, and accountability. Some
redistribution is also possible in this structure through a combination of tax and spending
decisions. On the other hand, there may be overlap and duplication in the provision of
services. Moreover, since the structure is less transparent, residents may be confused as to
who is actually responsible for which services.
In addition, in India as in other countries, a number of specialized agencies for
providing water supply, waste management, and transportation across a number of
municipalities exist. This approach has a number of advantages. For example, specialized
agencies can reap economies of scale and address the issue of spillovers, can be
professionally managed to ensure efficiency and can, to at least some extent, establish
and collect user charges without political considerations. On the other hand, there are
disadvantages. There may, for instance, be problems of coordination when a number of
specialized agencies providing different services are involved. In addition, these agencies
may have no local political accountability unless their decisions are subject to the
approval by the municipal executive. Furthermore, if municipal taxes go to support such
agencies without a clear linkage between the expenditure decisions of the specialized
agencies and the taxes collected by the municipalities, the absence of the ―Wicksellian
connection‖ between revenues and expenditures further reduces accountability.
Specialized agencies can certainly improve efficiency in the delivery of some services,
but if they are not locally accountable, it is far from clear that they will supply the right
services in the right places.
Effective fiscal decentralization requires that not only must appropriate functions
and adequate finances be devolved to the local governments, but so must control over
those they employ. In Indian cities, the primary responsibilities are vested in an executive
mayor chosen by elected representatives, and local officials are charged with
implementing the decisions taken by the executive. In practice, however, the role of the
mayor (or chairperson) as the executive head of the municipality is often confused with
that of the Municipal Commissioner—an official appointed by the state government who
is supposed to implement the policies approved by the executive. Since the local
government has no role whatsoever in the appointment, promotion, or transfer of the
Municipal Commissioner, it is hardly surprising that this official is, in reality, primarily
accountable to the state government rather than to the elected local representatives. In
addition to this confusion at the top, governance in most smaller municipalities also
suffers from inadequate administrative capacity to plan, effectively regulate, raise
revenues, and implement spending decisions. Moreover, both state and central politicians,
in varying degrees in different regions, often interfere in the functioning of municipalities.

10

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

The Expert Committee on the Governance in Bangalore Metropolitan Region
(Report of the Expert Committee 2004) recommended that the Commissioner of the
Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation should be selected by a committee constituted
by the state in consultation with the mayor and, more importantly, that the
commissioner‘s role should be legislatively redefined to make him/her clearly responsible
and accountable to the mayor and the corporation. If India‘s larger cities are to have
effective urban governance structures, similar steps need to be taken by all state
governments to make the commissioners in municipal corporations and municipalities
primarily responsible and accountable to the respective municipal bodies. Of course, so
long as the commissioner‘s career path remains essentially in the state bureaucracy, some
problem of ―dual subordination‖ (to both central and local authorities) still remains. but,
at a minimum, it is critical that the chief municipal officer should clearly be primarily
accountable to the municipality he or she serves rather than to the state, as is now the case.
The Constitution makes urban governance structures a matter to be determined by
the states. Although the 74th amendment accorded constitutional recognition to municipal
bodies, by and large the present urban governance structures have carried over from the
past. To strengthen participatory planning, the Constitutional amendment provided for the
setting up of Metropolitan Planning Committees to prepare the draft development plan in
every metropolitan area and similar District Planning Committees (DPCs) to consolidate
and co-ordinate planning for urban areas. In addition, the constitutional amendment
mandated the holding of Ward Sabhas (assemblies) to elicit the preferences of the people
for public services and to develop planning from the grassroots level. However, none of
these requirements were really observed in practice until the national Planning
Commission finally mandated the setting up of DPCs (India 2005). Despite this mandate,
urban local bodies in most states do not as yet have regular Ward Sabhas and, even when
they exist, these assemblies are not used either for urban planning or for eliciting the
preferences for public services. Similarly, many states are yet to legislate for, let alone
create, the required Metropolitan Planning Committees.
The issue of governance in India‘s major metropolitan areas is extremely
important not only for the millions who live there but also for the economic development
of the country as a whole. Big cities need a sound governance structure that works well.
To attain this, much more effort is needed to implement the ways of revealing citizen
preferences through the citizen access structures (such as Ward Sabhas and the various
planning committees) set out in the Constitution. Even more importantly, the roles that
different political and bureaucratic actors are supposed to play at the municipal level need
to be set out more clearly; and then these officials should be permitted to do their jobs
with far less interference from politicians at higher levels of government and with
primary accountability to those whom they are supposed to serve—local residents. Until
the basic urban governance structure is moved in these directions, Indian cities are, for
the most part, going to continue to be unable to respond flexibly or adequately to the
changing realities with which they are confronted.
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4. What Do Urban Local Governments Do?
Traditional fiscal federalism theory argues that the essential function of local
governments is allocative. The potential mobility of economic agents reduces the
effectiveness of local governments in carrying out redistribution. Similarly, the openness
of local economies means that they can do little in terms of stabilization (Oates 1972).
The main task of the local governments is thus to provide local goods and services within
the area under their jurisdictions.3 Except when overridden by distributive considerations,
efficiency requires that local governments should levy user charges on those who benefit
from the private goods that they provide, such as water supply, sewerage, transportation,
and recreation services—. Similarly, local public services benefiting the local population
in general should be financed by taxing residents, while services whose benefits spill over
jurisdictional boundaries usually need to be financed in part by intergovernmental
transfers. Finally, borrowing is, in principle, the best way to finance large capital
investments that will continue to provide services long into the future. Of course, it is
important to ensure that neither transfers nor borrowing turn into bailouts that soften the
budget constraint facing local government decision-makers.
Three key points should be noted about the 18 functions constitutionally devolved
to municipal bodies in India. First, the functions listed are identical for all types of
municipal bodies—whether huge metropolitan cities or small urban localities. Second,
since the extent to which these functions are actually devolved is at the discretion of state
governments, the extent of devolution may vary significantly across states. Third, most
states are reluctant to devolve functions to municipal governments in part because they
argue that they do not have the capacity to undertake them. In addition, because most
listed ―municipal‖ items are either in the constitution‘s list of state functions or in the
concurrent list of state and central functions, there is not only considerable concurrency
and overlap between states and municipalities but also between the central government
and municipal bodies. Assigning responsibility for the provision of specific services to a
specified level of government and ensuring that those who make the decisions are
adequately accountable for their actions is thus difficult. This problem is particularly
acute in the capital cities of the states where the overlap in functions between the state
government and the municipal corporation makes the system particularly opaque.4
In principle, there is nothing wrong with concurrent assignment of powers if
there is clear demarcation of functional domains. However, no state has yet taken the
initiative to undertake so-called ―activity mapping‖ for municipal governments necessary
3

This does not mean that local governments do not have any role in redistributive or stabilization functions.
Local governments sometimes have local employment programs (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997) and may also
play a role in implementing anti-poverty interventions (Rao and Das-Gupta 1995; Rao 2002).
4
In Delhi, the overlapping problem is even more acute as all the three levels of government—centre, the
Union Territory of Delhi and three municipal bodies (the Delhi Municipal Corporation, New Delhi
Municipal Committee, and Delhi Cantonment)—divide the powers among them in confusing ways (Mathur
2009).

12

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

to know precisely who is responsible for doing exactly what with sufficient clarity to
achieve efficiency and accountability in the provision of urban local services.5 Although
about all most state governments have done is to formalise the functions that were being
carried on by the various municipal bodies even before the 1991 Constitutional
amendment, the fact is that urban municipalities across the country have, to varying
degrees, been vested with a long list of functions under the various state municipal laws
relating to public health, welfare, safety, regulation, and developmental activities.
Functions relating to public health include water supply, sewers, sanitation, and waste
disposal/management. Welfare activities include social justice, safeguarding the interests
of weaker sections, creation and running of night shelters, street lighting, parks, education,
burial grounds and cremation facilities, playgrounds, and recreation. Regulatory functions
include prescribing and enforcing city plans, land use, and building by-laws, licensing of
shops and establishments, removal of encroachments on public land, registration of births
and deaths, and enforcing parking regulations. Public safety includes fire protection and
street lighting. Public works include construction and maintenance of inner city roads and
buildings. Development functions include town planning and development of markets. In
addition to all this, the 74th Constitutional amendment assigned additional development
functions to municipal governments such as planning for development, urban poverty
alleviation, protection of environment, and slum improvement and upgrading.
Recognizing that the scope and capacity to undertake various functions is, in fact,
likely to vary with the size and character of the municipal body, many states have
assigned significant powers with respect to education and healthcare, the regulation of
industries, and the provision of intra-city and inter-city transportation services to larger
cities. In some cases, independent service providers bypass the elected municipal
governments—often precisely because of disenchantment with poor public service
delivery by municipal bodies. In some areas water and sewer providers deliver services
beyond the boundaries of one municipality to reap economies of scale. Independent
service providers are often thought to insulate policy making from political vagaries,
thereby providing better public service delivery. Problems with this type of
organizational set up may arise from the agency‘s relative remoteness from the people it
serves and its lack of political accountability. In drawing up agreements with such service
providers, careful attention must be paid to balancing the desire for professional
competence and least-cost provision against the need for local governments to be fully
accountable to their residents for the provision of the public services for which they pay.
Ensuring clarity of assignment by specifying the responsibility of each level of
government for service delivery is only part of the story. Clarity must be matched both by
accountability to the local population and by authority in terms of the ability to manage
expenditures and to determine (within limits) revenues. Financial honesty and political
accountability require that municipal budgeting, financial reporting, and auditing should
be not only comprehensive, comprehensible, comparable, verifiable, but also
transparently public. In Brazil, for example, and increasingly in other countries, more and
5

Such mapping was recommended by the Administrative Reforms Commission (India 2007) but as yet
little has been done along these lines.
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more local budgets and financial accounts are freely accessible on the Internet, and in
some instances residents are actively encouraged to participate to some extent in
developing the expenditure plans for their areas. However, little has been done along
these lines in India.
Whether one goes this far or not, proper public expenditure management at any
level of government must (a) adequately control the total level of revenue and
expenditure, (b) appropriately allocate public resources among sectors and programs, and
(c) ensure that governmental institutions operate as efficiently as possible. To do this,
urban local governments need adequate authority to manage both the expenditure and
revenue sides of their budgets, sufficient administrative capacity to be able to do so, and
an appropriate incentive structure to encourage them to do so. Most Indian cities are
handicapped in all these areas. Central and state governments need to provide a more
adequate fiscal, financial, and institutional framework if municipal governments are to
have even a chance to respond adequately to the problems facing them. Higher levels of
government need to ensure that local officials are adequately trained and motivated to do
their jobs properly. Central and state governments could usefully establish a model
(framework) local budget law and financial reporting system and require adequate
external audit. Improving the local budgeting and financial system along these lines will
satisfy two essential requirements of good government by establishing the basis for
financial control and providing reasonably accurate, uniform, comparable, and timely
financial information.
None of these tasks is easy. For example, although improved accountability may
be the key to improved public sector performance, improved information is the key to
accountability. The systematic collection, analysis, and reporting of information that can
be used to verify compliance with goals and to assist future decisions is critical to
successful urban development. Such information is essential to informed local
participation through the political process and to the monitoring of local activity by the
central agencies responsible for supervising and (sometimes) financing such activity.
Unless the relevant local ―publics‖ are aware of what is done, how well it is done, how
much it cost, and who paid for it, no local constituency for effective government can be
created. Similarly, unless higher-level agencies can monitor and evaluate local
performance, there can be no assurance that functions of national importance will be
adequately performed once they have been decentralized. An important underpinning and
accompaniment of any successful program to strengthen urban local bodies must
therefore be, perhaps paradoxically, an improvement in national evaluation capacity.
Decentralization and improved central evaluation and assessment of local activities are
not substitutes—they are complements.
One essential element of the hard budget constraint needed to induce efficient
decisions by local governments in India is thus adequate central (and state) capacity in
the shape of credible information-gathering and evaluation. Such ―carrots‖ of central
financial support of local efforts as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal
Mission program (JNNURM; discussed below) need, at least implicitly, to be
accompanied by the possible ―stick‖ of reduced support if performance is inadequate; and
to shake a credible stick, one needs some standard of adequacy and some way of knowing
how performance measures up. Decentralizing functions to local governments does not
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imply that the central and state governments no longer have any responsibility. However,
the nature of central (and state) responsibility changes from delivering the services
themselves to regulating and monitoring the efficiency and equity of services delivered
by local governments. The essential tool needed for this task is an adequate and up-todate information base—generated, for example, by requiring local governments to file
uniform and informative budgets and financial and other reports. Unfortunately, this need
for extended and reliable information on local public finances and service delivery has
been sadly neglected in India. Unless a major effort to improve matters in this respect is
undertaken soon, it is hard to see how the adequacy and quality of urban public services
in most Indian cities can be maintained, let alone expanded and improved as the needs of
development require.
Better financial oversight of local finances by state and even central officials is
clearly necessary, not least because to a considerable extent local governments are
spending state and central funds. However, devising and implementing a system of
oversight that balances prudence with leaving the main decision-making powers at the
local level is not a simple task. Both conceptually and empirically, it has proven difficult
even in countries with excellent data to develop ways of measuring local financial
performance that will provide adequate indications of possible local mismanagement and,
more importantly, impending financial distress. It is important that much more effort and
thought be put into developing and implementing a municipal financial reporting system
that will be much more adequate in this regard than the present ―non-system.‖
In addition, if municipal governments are given more scope for making their own
decisions on what to do, the fact is that some will undoubtedly make mistakes and in
some instances perhaps even bankrupt (in some sense) a locality. While some such errors
are undoubtedly an essential part of ―growing‖ a more adequate urban governance and
finance structure, it is important that how such mistakes should be dealt with is
considered carefully as part of the needed rethinking of how India‘s big cities in
particular can and should be run more effectively and efficiently. Under what
circumstances if at all, for example, should municipal governments be taken over by
states? When a municipality cannot pay its debts or meet its current payroll, should it be
rescued by a state agency and placed in some form of trusteeship until its financial
position is again sustainable? Such questions are not easy to answer in general anywhere,
but they must nonetheless be thought about much more carefully than appears to be the
case today in any state.

5. Financing Urban Services: User Charges and Local Taxation
An important rule of sound fiscal decentralization is that finances should follow functions
(Bahl 2002). Local governments need access to adequate revenue sources to finance the
public services they are mandated to provide. In India, it is clear that the lack of adequate
resources is one key reason municipal bodies have not been able to provide satisfactory
levels of the assigned public services.
The poor state of urban infrastructure due to significant underfunding was the
main motivation for initiating a central program—the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban
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Renewal Mission (JNNURM)—with the aim of improving developmental incentives by
linking grants for urban renewal to reforms at both state and local levels aimed at
improving fiscal efficiency of the urban local bodies, freeing urban land and housing
markets, and preventing the municipal bodies and the states from adopting protectionist
policies. The first phase of JNNURM—as discussed further below—covers the period
2005–12. After a slow start, the resources transferred from the centre picked up in the
next few years. However, the slowdown of the economy following the global financial
crisis—coupled with the political decision to provide particular stimulus to the
commercial vehicle sector—led the central government both to dilute the reform
requirements set out in the JNNURM program (e.g., to generate significant own
resources by reforming property taxes and liberalizing land and housing markets) and to
use a considerable portion of JNNURM funds to purchase buses for urban transport
rather than for urban renewal as originally envisaged.
Such changes in transfers matter a great deal since, by law, local governments in
India cannot run deficits and are therefore required to restrict expenditures to available
revenues. Municipal spending in India is extremely low because both own revenues and
transfers from central and state governments are low. In 2001–02, for example, aggregate
revenues of urban local bodies amounted to only 0.76 per cent of GDP, with about onethird of this amount coming from transfers (Mohanty et al. 2007). Such figures are very
low in comparison with countries like Brazil, where total municipal revenues account for
7.4 per cent of GDP, municipal own revenues for 2.6 per cent, and municipal taxes for
about 2 per cent (Afonso and Araujo 2006). Not surprisingly, the standards of municipal
services in India are generally abysmal.
(i) User Charges
One important source of local finance should be from user charges imposed for services
provided. To a considerable extent, a local government is like a business providing direct
services in the form of what are essentially private goods (like water) to its customers
(local residents). Financing such services through user fees or charges not only provides
funds with which to supply such services but also provides invaluable information on
which services should be provided, in what quantity and quality, and to whom. Given the
proximity to the population and the predominance of private good characteristics of many
local services, levying user charges is feasible. Often, however, it appears to be
politically impossible to levy user charges when the quality of the services rendered is
poor. The result is that a vicious circle is set up, with low quality public services leading
to an inability to collect user charges leading to further deterioration in the service levels.
This circle needs to be broken, and not only to get revenues to improve services.
User charges are especially important as signals to consumers of the scarcity value of the
services and to providers about the demands that need to be met through service
provision. Establishing this strong link between demand and supply helps to generate
resources and ensures efficiency in production and accountability in service delivery.
User charges are particularly relevant for services such as water, sewers, electricity,
garbage disposal, public transit, and recreation, and are hence generally most important in
large metropolitan areas which provide more of such services.
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At present, urban fees are not significant in India, with the proceeds from non-tax
revenues from all urban local bodies amounting to a mere 0.13 per cent of GDP. Mohanty
et al. (2007) show that in 10 large municipal corporations less than 10 per cent of the cost
of providing services was recovered through fees; in another six, cost recovery was
between 10 and 20 per cent. Only in two of the 25 municipal corporations examined was
cost recovery greater than 75 per cent. Interestingly, cost recovery on the whole was
relatively greater in those cities in which the estimated normative under-spending was
lower. If low cost recovery and poor service quality are thus connected, it may prove
possible to collect more user charges, especially if the quality of the services provided
can be improved—for example, with the aid of a well-directed transfer system, as
discussed in Section 6 below.
Other important sources of non-tax revenues are licence fees for shops and
establishments and parking fees. A common feature seen virtually in every urban area in
India, particularly the largest cities, is the poor implementation of regulations relating to
land use and commercial space occupation. The present system of issuing licences and
the common flouting of regulations by shops and establishments provide enormous and
highly undesirable rent-seeking opportunities for local officials. Public interest litigation
relating to the construction and running of businesses in residential areas against the
regulations led to the demolition of several shops and establishments in Delhi in 2005. In
some cities, from time to time, the poor implementation of the regulations has been
accompanied by periodic amnesties that legalise them after the fact, favouring in
particular the politically well connected and powerful.
Finally, parking fees in major metropolitan cities might be able to generate
substantial revenues (Barter 2010). The main rationales for levying parking fees are to
reduce congestion of vehicles on the roads and to generate resources to construct parking
spaces. In most metropolitan cities in India the combination of the poor quality of the
public transportation system, inadequate provision of parking spaces, and the present
negligible charges for parking, whether legally or illegally, results in large-scale traffic
congestion on roads. With sharp increases in household incomes and the emergence of a
large middle class, the number of vehicles is going to increase sharply in the coming
years. Introducing a more comprehensive policy of charging parking fees in accordance
with the scarcity value of open spaces in cities should reduce traffic and at the same time
generate revenues to construct multi-storeyed parking places—although neither objective
may be achieved without much more rigorous enforcement of street parking regulations.
Creating better parking infrastructure in the central business district of major
metropolitan cities may perhaps be one appropriate area in which to explore the publicprivate partnership (PPP) approach to capital finance discussed in Section 7 (and, as
noted in Section 6, eligible for JNNURM assistance).
(ii) Local Taxation
Reliable and effective local taxation is essential to ensure hard budget constraints in
financing local public goods (Oates 2005). In particular, it is important that local
governments have adequate tax powers to ensure a strong linkage between revenue and
expenditure decision at the margin (Bird and Smart 2010). As Bird and Slack (2007)
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argue, the most appropriate tax at the local level is that on property, not only because real
property is immobile but also because differences in service levels are reflected in
property values so that the tax on real property is like a benefit tax. In many developed
countries, income taxes generate significant revenues for local governments. However, it
is unlikely that such taxes, even applied as supplemental rates to the central income tax,
would make much sense in India given the problems in administering even the central tax,
the intervening supervisory role of the states, and the extreme heterogeneity of Indian
cities. A local payroll tax would perhaps be easier to administer, but it too is unlikely to
be advisable in India in part because it creates a tax barrier to employment in the formal
sector and may reduce the employment intensity of production. Another tax used at the
local level in many countries is some form of sales or consumption tax, including
selective taxes on, for example, entertainment services and hotels. Finally, a number of
countries have local business taxes (Bird 2003). Most of these local business taxes
involve significant exportation of tax burden to non-residents, are costly to administer,
and impose substantial compliance burdens. Nonetheless, if Indian cities are to access
additional tax revenues, some form of taxation on business and consumption may be
worth further exploration.
Indian municipal bodies can levy and collect only those taxes that are specified by
the state governments from the list of taxes assigned to the states in the Constitution.
Unsurprisingly, the taxing powers assigned are non-uniform across states. However, the
most important local tax bases fall broadly within those indicated above as potentially
useful: (a) taxes on lands and buildings, (b) a tax on the entry of goods into a local area
for consumption, use, or sale, which is known as octroi, (c) taxes on luxuries including
those on entertainment, amusement, betting and gambling, (d) taxes on advertisements
other than those published in newspapers or broadcast on radio or television, (e) taxes on
non-motorized vehicles, (f) taxes on animals and boats, (g) tolls, and (h) taxes on
professions, trades, callings, and employment.
In reality, however, most of these taxes are simply not levied in most urban areas.
The most important tax actually levied at the local level is undoubtedly that on land and
buildings (real properties). Octroi was an important source of municipal revenue in some
states until recently. However, the tax was considered obnoxious, distorting, iniquitous,
and a major source of corruption, and it is not surprising that all states except
Maharashtra have now abolished the tax. Even in Maharashtra, the tax is levied only in
municipal corporations and not by smaller cities. Some states replaced local octroi with
an ―entry tax‖ at the state level—a tax which is not much better in economic terms and is
also an impediment to internal trade. In most cases, even when states replaced octroi by
entry tax, they did not compensate municipal governments for the loss of revenue.
Generally, when states abolished octroi, they provided no alternative source of revenue
and simply increased the size of the unfunded mandates confronting municipal
governments. In a few states, however, municipal governments do have some limited
access to consumption taxes. In Kerala, for instance, the power to levy an entertainment
tax is given to the urban local governments. In Andhra Pradesh, local governments
receive a fixed share of the revenue from entertainment tax. In a few states, urban local
bodies also collect some revenue from advertisement tax.
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The property tax is by far the most important source of own revenues of
municipal bodies although collections are generally poor and the revenue buoyancy of the
tax is low. Recently, however, initiatives in some municipal corporations have shown that
revenues from this tax can be substantially increased with strong local leadership and
proper reform of the tax system. Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP; Greater
Bangalore Municipal Corporation), for example, reformed its property tax by revising the
area-based values, introducing a self-assessment system and improving the technology of
the payments system with the result that revenue increased from Rs. 4400 million in
2007–08 to Rs. 7800 million in 2008–09 and increased still further the following year.
The starting point for property tax reform in India was the introduction of areabased assessment by the Patna Municipal Corporation in 1992–93. Previously, the tax
was collected on the basis of the annual rental value, defined as gross annual value rent at
which the property may be reasonably be expected to be rented. This system gave
enormous discretion to tax collectors and yielded little in tax revenue. The prescription of
unit values (per square foot) based on the area of location and type of construction of the
property instead of the annual rental value removed most discretion from the tax
collectors and resulted in such a large increase in base that the tax rate was reduced from
44 per cent to 9 per cent.6 Subsequently, municipal corporations in a number of states
adopted the Patna model. In Bangalore, for example, properties are classified into
different zones based on the guidance values set by the Department of Stamps and
Registration. For each zone, rental value per square foot was determined on the basis of
type and quality of construction and age of the buildings. A handbook was brought out
detailing these values so that each individual property owner can now compute his tax
liability simply by plugging in the location, type of construction, and area of his property,
and then pay the tax online. Similar reforms in other urban local bodies might reasonably
be able to double their (low) revenues from property tax.
A major weakness of this system is the need to revise the unit values periodically
in keeping with changes in prices. In the absence of periodic revision revenues will not
respond to changes in the values of properties, and the buoyancy of the tax will depend
only upon the addition of new properties. As a rule, it is politically difficult to change
values periodically. One way to overcome this problem and keep tax revenues expanding
with needs might be to link the guided values automatically to the index of property
values in various cities determined by the National Housing Bank. This system could be
expanded if states would initiate the estimation of price changes on real property in every
urban local body based on the methodology adopted by the National Housing Bank and
then link the guided values automatically to the price index to estimate the tax liability.
Several important lessons from the Bangalore experiment in the reform of
property tax are worth noting. First, the system should be simple and transparent enough
to be easily understood by the general public. Second, there should be clarity in the
reform process and thorough public discussion and debate when the reform is adopted. It
is important for the tax department to provide prompt and clear answers to queries by the
general public through newspapers, radio, and television as well as through so-called
6

In view of the very considerable degree of under-spending in Patna—the worse of the 30 cities examined
by Mohanty et al. (2007)—its pioneering role in property tax reform has apparently not been carried
through over time in a way that sustains municipal revenues.
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―social media‖ when appropriate. It is also important to facilitate online payment of the
tax so that the taxpayer does not have to be in contact with the tax collector. Computation
of the property tax liability based on the guided values and online payment of the tax
obviates the need for taxpayers to go to the tax department and face harassment simply in
order to pay the tax. This kind of direct, simple action to simplify and improve local
fiscal procedures is needed to enable Indian cities to cope more adequately with their
changing reality.
Another major reform needed in the property tax system is the expansion of the
tax base. The Administrative Reforms Commission (India 2007) noted that only about
60–70 per cent of properties in urban areas are actually assessed. A large number of
property owners simply do not pay the tax. The Commission recommended matching the
properties paying the tax with those in the Geographical Information System (GIS) to
identify those that are not paying the tax. BBMP has undertaken this exercise for all
properties within its 800 sq. kilometre area. By matching the actual properties paying the
tax, excluding government buildings and slums, it is possible to identify the properties
evading the tax. The Bangalore experiment is worth replicating in other municipal
corporations and municipalities.
Widespread evasion exists in part because much of the new construction as well
as additions to existing buildings have been done without getting proper approval. Some
have expressed the fear that allowing such properties to pay the tax could mean giving
them legal recognition. It is important to keep these two issues separate. It is also
important to examine the nature of violations. In general, if violations are not major,
property owners should be allowed to pay the penalty and regularise them.7 On the other
hand, in cases where the violations are major, the structures should be demolished.
Apart from the property tax, which is potentially a good source of local revenues
but definitely needs reform, larger cities in particular are likely to need some additional
broad-based tax source, such as a supplemental rate ―piggybacked‖ on a national or state
tax and administered with that tax, but with the proceeds going to the local government.
Any such local rates should be set within predetermined limits. A ceiling is needed to
prevent localities from exporting tax burdens (in excess of benefits received) to nonresidents and a floor to prevent richer areas from ―stealing‖ tax base from poorer areas.
In India, if the central income tax were a broader, simpler, and more effectively
administered tax than at present, perhaps state and even some larger local governments
might be allowed to piggyback their rates subject to a ceiling rate. Such a system would
reduce the scope for evasion and avoidance of income tax, provide a stable source of
revenues to both state and local governments and, in particular, ensure that large business
and manufacturing centres like Mumbai have the funds to maintain and upgrade their
infrastructure to sustain their key role in India‘s national economic dynamism. However,
7

Recently the government of Karnataka state attempted to pass an ordinance regularising 700,000
illegal constructions within the Bangalore Municipal Corporation area on the eve of an election to the
municipal body. The scheme (called the ―Akrama-Sakrama‖ scheme) was approved by the state cabinet but
in the end did not receive the approval of the Governor on the grounds that the government should pass the
legislation and not simply pass an ordinance.
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before such measures can be considered many changes would have take place not only at
the constitutional level but also, equally importantly, in terms of political willingness to
tax adequately and properly at all levels of government.
Another possibility might be a surcharge on the consumption tax as an additional
source of revenue for municipal governments. As with the income tax, however, for such
measures to be considered there would first have to be a more or less uniform sales tax
base at both the central and state levels, something which has not yet been achieved,
although considerable progress has been made in this direction. Interestingly, even in the
present (incomplete) transition to a ―dual‖ central and state goods and services tax (GST),
Gujarat recently decided to impose an additional one percentage point levy on the sales
tax, earmarking the levy as compensation to the municipal corporations for the loss of
revenue from abolishing octroi. As the present consumption tax system is replaced by the
GST regime, the possibility of providing additional revenue to local governments more
generally by (as in Japan, for example) levying an additional percentage point for this
purpose at the central level or perhaps as each state decides and then distributing the
revenues to localities by formula might perhaps be considered.8 Firm estimates of GST
base are not available but a conservative estimate made at the National Institute of Public
Finance and Policy (NIPFP) for 2007–08 put the GST base at Rs. 16,000 billion after
adjusting for the prevailing exemptions (Rao and Chakraborty, 2010). A 1 per cent levy
on this base would yield Rs. 160 billion for municipal governments, which is about 0.34
per cent of GDP. Since even the most optimistic estimate of revenue from property tax is
just about 0.2 per cent of GDP (Mathur, Thakur and Rajyadhyaksha, 2009), a 1 per cent
levy on the GST could yield virtually double the amount collected from property tax.
This possible important source of revenue deserves serious consideration.
As a final note on local taxes, it is particularly important that states cease the
pernicious practice of abolishing local taxes without providing adequate substitute
sources of revenue to municipalities. For example, the Gujarat government abolished
octroi to fulfil its election promise without any mechanism to compensate the municipal
corporations, although later they decided to levy a one percentage point additional rate on
the sales tax. Rajasthan and Haryana simply abolished the property tax without even
consulting the urban local governments. Punjab put the threshold for the property tax so
high that almost two-thirds of the properties are exempted. Since the property tax is the
only important tax for municipal governments, when a state government abolishes or
severely restricts this tax, it is deliberately disempowering its municipalities.

8

Conceivably, some states may perhaps even want to consider allowing at least the large metropolitan
areas to impose (piggyback) an additional rate of their own on the state tax base but this is unlikely to be a
good idea given the complexities involved in making such a system work. Even Canada, which makes
considerable use of such provincial supplementary rates on its central GST as described in detail in Bird
and Gendron (2010), has not considered, and is unlikely to consider, extending this facility below the level
of the province.
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6. Financing Urban Services: Intergovernmental Transfers
In principle, municipal governments should raise revenues from their residents to finance
local public services. In most countries, however, municipalities are seldom able to
generate the required revenues from their own source. Transfers from higher levels of
government either by way of tax devolution or grants are therefore found in every
country, as are specific purpose transfers intended to ensure minimum standards of
services for those with significant benefit spillovers.
(i) General Grants
In India, state governments are constitutionally required to appoint a State Finance
Commission (SFC) every five years to determine the measures needed to improve the
financial position of the municipalities, including the distribution between the state
government and the municipalities of state revenues and the allocation of such proceeds
between municipalities at all levels, the revenues that may be assigned to or utilized by
municipalities, and the grants-in-aid to municipalities from state funds. Since the 1991
Constitutional amendment, the Central Finance Commission (CFC), which reports every
five years), has also been obligated to make recommendations on measures needed to
augment state funds in order for states to be able to supplement municipal resources as
recommended by the respective SFC. As yet, however, the CFC has not done so,
essentially because most SFC reports have not been made available on a timely basis or
have been unusable, either because they were not accepted for implementation by the
states or because the methodology employed was not only not uniform but also left much
to be desired. As the Twelfth Finance Commission (India 2004) noted, even when the
recommendations of the SFCs were accepted by the governments, they were not fully
implemented in letter or spirit and the annual budgetary allocations were often well short
of the recommendations. Moreover, the SFCs often did not have the expertise or time to
undertake the technical exercises required to estimate the requirements of the
municipalities, even if the necessary information and data existed, which was almost
never the case. In short, the presumed goal of providing an objective and scientific basis
for state transfers to municipalities through the device of the SFC has not been achieved.
Most state transfers to municipalities are ad hoc—often based simply on past trends—
inadequate, opaque, and often discretionary. After transfers, as before, urban local bodies
are left with large unfunded mandates and woefully inadequate public services.
Moreover, since the CFCs have been unable to take account of the
recommendations of the SFCs, they have usually simply set an essentially arbitrary and
token amount for municipal grants in their recommendations. For instance, the Eleventh
Finance Commission recommended a grant of Rs. 20 billion for the five-year period
2000–05 and the Twelfth Finance Commission recommended Rs. 50 billion grants to
urban local bodies for 2005–10. In short, both central and state block transfers to urban
local governments are wholly inadequate and bear no relationship to expenditure needs.
Major revisions are needed if central-state-municipal fiscal transfers are to play a
meaningful role in empowering India‘s cities to achieve their development potential.
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(ii) Specific Purpose Grants
Most specific purpose grants come from central government ministries. As noted above,
the major specific purpose central transfer for urban local bodies is the Jawaharlal Nehru
Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) under which grants are given to upgrade the urban
infrastructure on the condition that the states and the municipalities will undertake
reforms. This ambitious program, intended to augment urban infrastructure and services,
is linked to a reform agenda that includes doing away with urban land ceiling act and rent
control act as well as reforms in property tax. Rs. 500 billion is to be allocated from
central funds during 2006–12, with matching contributions from city and state
governments. Track I of JNNURM assistance is to flow to 63 identified cities to enable
planned development, ensure integrated development of urban infrastructure, and ensure
provision of urban services to the poor. Under Track II, assistance will be extended to
other cities under two programs—Urban Infrastructure Development Schemes for Small
and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and Integrated Housing and Slum Development
Programmes (IHSDP).
Admissible components for assistance under JNNURM include urban renewal,
sewerage and water supply, solid waste management, storm water drainage, urban
transport, parking spaces on PPP basis, development of heritage areas, prevention and
rehabilitation of soil erosion, and preservation of water bodies. Among the municipal
level reforms associated with JNNURM financing are introduction of an accrual based
accounting system, reform of the property tax by using GIS information, levying user
charges to recover 100 per cent of operation and maintenance charges, provision of basic
services to urban poor, and internal earmarking of budgets for this purpose. State-level
reforms under JNNURM include enactment of public disclosure law, full implementation
of the provisions of 74th Constitutional amendment including the setting up of District
Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees, enactment of community
participation laws, associating elected representatives with the function of city planning,
repeal of the urban land ceiling act and reform of the rent control act, and rationalization
of the stamp duty to bring it down to no more than 5 per cent within the next five years.
In addition, optional reforms relate to revision of by-laws, simplification of legal and
procedural frameworks for conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes,
earmarking 20–25 per cent of developed land for economically weaker sections of the
population, introduction of computerized process of registration of real properties,
making water harvesting mandatory in all buildings and by-laws to introduce recycling of
water, encouraging public-private partnerships, and sundry structural and administrative
reforms. The grant and loan portions and the matching ratios for the centre, state, and
local bodies (including parastatals and financial institutions) are shown in the following
table.
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Financing Pattern for JNNURM
(Per Cent of Total Project Cost)
Urban Infrastructure and Governance
Funding Pattern
Cities with more than 4 million population
Cities with more than one million but less
than 4 million population
Cities in North Eastern States and Jammu
and Kashmir
Other Cities
Setting up desalination plants
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Grant
Centre

State

35
50

15
20

ULB/Parastatals/Loan
from Financial
Institutions
50
30

90

10

-

80
80

10
10

10
10

JNNURM is clearly a comprehensive specific purpose scheme for urban renewal
and infrastructure support intended to foster many of the reforms in urban governance
and finance discussed earlier. Indeed, it is in all likelihood too comprehensive and might
perhaps have been more effectively focused on a shorter and more easily attainable list of
objectives. In reality, however, little has happened so far since states have proved
reluctant to undertake the reforms required to access the assistance. In the first year
(2005–06) of operation, only 15.6 per cent of the grants estimated in the budget were
allocated. In the second year, although the estimated outlay increased to 78 per cent of
budget, the total amount disbursed was still less than Rs. 36 billion. However, with the
onset of the financial crisis in 2008–09, disbursements increased sharply. Unfortunately,
this increase was achieved in part by diluting the reform content of the package, for
example, by using the funds to purchases buses as part of the fiscal stimulus to the
commercial vehicles sector. Putting more buses on already overcrowded urban streets
may well increase rather than reduce congestion and other on-going urban management
problems. Just as the states have been reluctant to undertake the pro-market reforms
called for by JNNURM, the centre has, regrettably, proved too ready to use the funds
committed for purposes other than those originally intended.
7. Financing Urban Infrastructure
For India‘s cities to play the role they should in the country‘s future development,
considerable investment will be needed in urban infrastructure. Even if tax and user
charge reforms increase the resources required for basic urban public services and
maintenance expenditures as discussed in Section 5, substantial improvements in urban
infrastructure will require resources well beyond the capacity of even the best run urban
local bodies to generate. Major capital works in urban areas in other countries are often
financed at least in part from central funds, and correctly so to the extent that some of the
benefits from such works may be felt nationally as well as locally. The major effects of
urban infrastructure projects, however, are clearly local and the main benefits are reaped
by local residents (including local businesses as well as households) usually through
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capitalization in local property values. It thus seems only right that much of the cost
should be substantially borne by local residents.
Four ways to finance major capital expenditures are discussed briefly here: local
borrowing; levying developmental charges in the residents; selling land and other assets;
and public-private partnerships.
(i) Borrowing
When the benefits from infrastructure projects are enjoyed over a period of time, it may
be both fair and efficient to finance such projects in part or whole by borrowing.
Moreover, borrowing may be the only practical way to finance large capital projects
without large and undesirable fluctuations in local tax rates from year to year. However,
municipalities in India can contract loans only if they are permitted to do so by the state
government.9 In most cases, state governments have to guarantee local borrowings, in
which case the loan becomes the liability of the state and is included in the overall ceiling
under the respective fiscal responsibility legislations. States are reluctant to guarantee
municipal bonds because their fiscal responsibility legislation requires them to limit their
committed liabilities to 0.5 per cent of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) and their
fiscal deficit at 3 per cent of GSDP.10 Municipal corporations must thus issue bonds on
the strength of their own credit rating rather than based on state government guarantees.
State governments permit urban local governments to borrow under their
respective municipal laws, which lay down the framework for borrowing: the projects for
which the borrowing is allowed, the volume of borrowing and the security to be pledged,
the procedure for applying to the state for the permission to borrow, and the manner in
which accounts must be kept. If local bodies borrow without state government guarantees,
generally they must place some revenue stream in escrow in order to guarantee the
service of the debt. In most cases, state governments only allow municipal corporations
to borrow from the market based on the value of their real property tax base. Most states
have issued guidelines for local borrowing, such as borrowing should be for less than 30
years, the interest rate should not exceed interest rate on government securities, and there
should be sufficient provisioning for debt servicing.

9

Under Article 293 of the Constitution, even state governments have to seek the permission of the central
government to borrow if they are indebted to the latter. The pattern of plan financing until 2004–05, when
much plan assistance was given to the states in the form of central loans, ensured that states were indeed
usually so indebted. Consequently, when states borrow from the market in effect the Union Finance
Ministry, Planning Commission, and the Reserve Bank of India really determine the allocation of market
borrowing to each state.
10
The 3 per cent GSDP target recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission was supposed to be
reached by 2009–10. However, the Government of India raised the fiscal deficit limit to 3.5 per cent and
later to 4 per cent of GSDP in 2008–09 as a part of its fiscal stimulus package, and many states revised
their targets accordingly. The Twelfth Finance Commission also recommended that states should enact
fiscal responsibility legislation; 28 states (with the most important exception being West Bengal) have done
so.
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Only recently have municipal corporations accessed funds from the capital market.
By and large, most such borrowing has been from public institutions such as Housing and
Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) or Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) for
housing and water supply schemes. After Credit Rating Information Services Ltd.
(CRISIL) began rating municipal corporations in 1996, however, the groundwork
necessary for the municipal bond market was established. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation was the first municipal entity to issue Rs. 1 billion bond with the credit
rating of ―A+‖. Subsequently, other credit rating agencies began to rate municipal
corporations and a number of municipal corporations have issued bonds, particularly after
the Ministry of Urban Development issued guidelines for tax-free municipal bonds. The
critical requirement for issuance of such bonds is that the municipal corporation issuing
the bonds is required to maintain a debt-service coverage ratio of at least 1.25 throughout
the period. 11
Despite these developments, not much has happened in the municipal bond
market in India. The volume of bonds issued has been small and trading very thin. In total,
only nine municipal corporations have so far issued bonds amounting to Rs. 6.2 billion,
in part because few can fulfil the collaterization condition mentioned above. Although so
far the amount of resources raised from the bond market by the municipal corporations is
small, all bonds were issued on their own strength and not based on state government
guarantee, with the exception of those issued by Bangalore Municipal Corporation and
Indore Municipal Corporation. So long as there is no state bailout, as time goes on the
demonstration effect may lead to still more municipal recourse to borrowing for capital
finance. The regulations of the JNNURM program provide another impetus for widening
and deepening the bond market: the centre and states together will provide 50 per cent of
the resources required for investment in urban infrastructure as grants if the municipal
corporation can generate or borrow the other 50 per cent. Further development of the
municipal bond market could increase the flexibility of urban finance in the future.
(ii) Development Charges
One way to finance basic urban infrastructure, particularly in new areas being developed,
is to levy development charges based on the land area being developed. A development
charge is a one-time levy imposed on property developers (including Development
Authorities) to finance growth-related capital costs for the area where the development
takes place. The objective is to finance the infrastructure associated with the new
development project by taxing those who are presumed to benefit directly in the form of
increased property values owing to the new infrastructure.. Generally, developers recover
the amount by charging the property owners based on the land area owned by them in the
new development project. Who ultimately bears the cost of course depends on the
demand and supply conditions for land and housing in the area. On the whole, however,
in view of the relative scarcity of land and the strong demand for land and houses in
urban areas in India, most development charges are probably ultimately borne by the
buyers. When well designed and implemented, development charges in effect amount to a
11

Debt-service coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of net income (after meeting all obligations) to long
term debt service obligations.
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form of marginal cost pricing of urban infrastructure and may thus encourage more
orderly and efficient development of urban agglomerations.
Such charges are feasible in newly developed areas within urban agglomerations.
However, in practice in places where parallel Development Authorities exist with the
mandate of creating housing infrastructure, the charges are collected by them and not by
the municipal bodies. From the perspective of sensible urban finance and planning it is
unfortunate that these Authorities are directly responsible to the respective state
governments and not to the municipal body concerned.12 Dividing up capital and
operational functions and finances in this way evidently makes it more difficult to
develop coherent urban policies.
(iii) Proceeds from Sale of Land and Buildings
On the face of it, land for housing and for commercial purposes is scarce in all urban
areas, given the high growth of urban population. In many urban agglomerations, as just
mentioned, Development Authorities have been set up to acquire land and to develop it
either for sale or to directly build affordable houses for the poor and middle-income
groups.13 They acquire land from the private owners, mostly agricultural land in the
surrounding areas, put the basic infrastructure in place, and then sell the ‗improved‘ land
for housing or commercial building purposes. Generally, they generate considerable
surpluses which could be used to improve infrastructure and services in municipal areas.
Despite the frequent complaints that land for housing and commercial purposes
in most cities are scarce, there is in fact often considerable land potentially available in
urban areas, much of it owned by public sector agencies such as railways and defence as
well as by municipal bodies themselves. An essential first step is to make a complete
inventory of land potentially available for development and sale in municipal areas. Once
this is done, it may be possible to develop such lands, sell them, and use the proceeds to
finance urban infrastructure. In the case of the defence sector, for example, the
cantonments that were created were initially outside cities. However, as cities expanded
over the years, they have come within the urban agglomeration. Cantonments run their
own systems of service delivery, including schools and hospitals, and could certainly be
located outside the city limits, reducing the risk to the safety of civilians at the same time.
The central government, with co-operation from the state governments, should take
action to relocate such establishments, with the state government or the municipal
corporation paying for the cost of land acquisition and redevelopment. The relocation of
defence establishments could release large chunks of land and thus help reduce
skyrocketing real estate prices. The proceeds from the sale of these properties can be used
for redevelopment of defence establishments outside the city, and any surplus revenue
earmarked for augmenting urban infrastructure and services.

12

The Delhi Development Authority until recently was not even accountable to the Delhi State
administration but was under the Union Home Ministry.
13
In some instances, however, the Development Authority has ended up acting as a monopoly agency, thus
restricting the supply of housing in cities and defeating its original purpose.
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Much the same holds for vacant land belonging to other agencies which could
also, after proper development, be disposed of and the proceeds shared between the
municipal body and other owners. When the development of infrastructure by the
municipality increases the capital value of such land, any gains realized through sale
should be shared with the municipality. Of course, all these issues are contentious, and
consensus on them will not be easy to achieve. Nonetheless, if centre and state
governments can cooperate, it should certainly be possible to work out an acceptable
formula for sharing the proceeds from the sale of land that would provide some needed
infrastructure finance to growing cities.
(iv) Public-Private Partnerships
In India‘s complex public sector it may often be so difficult to get different components
of the public sector to cooperate that a better approach may be to deal with the private
sector. Indeed, public-private partnerships (PPPs) may have significant potential for
financing and delivery of urban services. For example, the private sector may be asked to
contribute funds for specified services in return for certain rights or future incomes. There
are many services such as water supply sewerage, solid waste management, recreational
facilities, rain water harvesting, and urban transportation where public-private
partnerships are eminently feasible in principle.
Indeed, PPPs have a number of potential advantages in delivering urban public
services. First, the urban local government does not have to spend the money up front.
Second, contracting out services may result in greater efficiency as better service delivery.
Empirical studies show that contracting out generally results in lowering of unit costs of
services (Kitchen 2002). Chennai was the first city in India to initiate contracting out
municipal solid waste management services to a foreign private agency, ONYX, a
Singapore-based company. The scope of privatization includes activities such as
sweeping, collection, storing, transporting of municipal solid waste, and creating public
awareness in three municipal zones. ONYX collects about 1100 metric tons of waste
from three zones per day and transports it to open dumps. This experiment holds a lot of
promise for other municipal corporations and municipalities as well. A number of other
municipalities have contracted out waste disposal and solid waste management to the
private sector, including to NGOs.
Another successful example is in the provision of water supply in Hubli-Dharwar,
Belgaum, and Gulbarga cities of Karnataka State. Residents of these cities used to get
water supply for only one or two hours a day. However, the PPP arrangement, undertaken
on a pilot basis to cover about 200,000 residents in the three cities, enabled them to enjoy
the benefits of a continuous water supply with a state of the art water distribution system
and at little additional cost. The private partner in this case is a French water company,
Veolia Water, which was entrusted with the task of providing 100 per cent metered
customer connections. The responsibility for providing adequate supply of bulk water
was entrusted to the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board (KUWSDB).
Considering the enormous success of this pilot, Karnataka government has approved
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upscaling of the project to the entire population in the three cities (Ahluwalia and Nair
2010).
Mixed public-private financing of urban infrastructure definitely deserves to be
further explored in the Indian context. At the same time, care must be taken to ensure that
certain conditions are satisfied if this approach is to produce beneficial results (Engel et al.
2010). This approach is most likely to prove successful when projects are carefully
designed and implemented, and when the responsible public agencies are technically and
financially able to hold up their end of the deal. Weak governments cannot rely on private
agents to overcome their weaknesses and expect to make the best possible bargains for
the public they represent. Governments must also be careful that they do not end up
assuming thedownside risk of projects, while allowing their private partners to reap any
upside gains. Similarly, care must be exerted to ensure that what occurs is not simply the
replacement of public sector borrowing by (often more expensive) private sector
borrowing. Privatizing the design, construction, and operation of urban infrastructure
may have many merits if done properly, but it is neither a panacea nor free.
8. Conclusion
Cities are the central drivers of growth the world over: they are the leading edge of
economic dynamism. However, the extent to which cities fulfil this role by promoting
competition, galvanising innovation, and accelerating growth depends critically on the
nature, adequacy and flexibility of urban governance and finance. Adequate finance is
necessary to ensure satisfactory standards of infrastructure and services, and finance
needs to be flexible enough to accommodate sometimes rapid changes in circumstances.
Governance systems determine not only the allocative and technical efficiency of
spending but also the responsiveness and accountability with which services are actually
delivered. Good policies, efficient and responsive local governance systems, and sound
arrangements to finance public services are thus all critical elements in sustainable urban
development. They shape the nature and quality of public services provided as well as the
structure of incentives and accountability.
This paper identifies a number of reforms needed in India‘s urban governance and
finance to ensure competitive standards of urban public services and effective governance
systems that are responsive, efficient, and effective. Clearly, no one system of urban
governance is likely to work equally well for all urban local bodies. The governance
system adopted should vary with the size of the urban local body and the nature of the
institutions in the area where that body is located. It can be particularly important from a
national perspective, for instance, for the largest cities to be somewhat insulated from
localized and parochial biases by being made more independent of states. Moreover,
emphasis should be put on developing governance system in cities that promote
cosmopolitanism and accommodative policies to promote healthy social and economic
interactions.
All Indian cities now suffer from many problems: ambiguous expenditure
assignment (including independent and higher-level agencies operating under different
mandates), inadequate attention to critical issues of public finance management, poorly
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developed institutions and mechanisms for participatory planning, and inadequate and
poorly implemented resources with respect to own source revenues, intergovernmental
transfers, and methods of financing needed for urban infrastructure development.
Solutions to most of these problems are not hard to find in the literature, by looking at
experience elsewhere, and by considering local innovative actionsalready seen in a few
cities in India.. Such solutions range from essential reforms in the property tax system
and adequate exploitation of user charges and fees for various services delivered through
reformed central and state transfers to more imaginative exploitation of various possible
ways to finance urban infrastructure. To achieve much success with such reforms,
however, what is needed is stronger urban leadership and, especially, fundamental
changes to governance structures, such as the effective use of State Finance Commissions
and the implementation of many of the reforms set out in the JNNURMM program.
Such reforms in urban governance and finance are critical for improving the
quality of life of the people living in urban areas and ensuring that India‘s cities, and
especially its large metropolitan areas, realize their potential as key drivers of economic
growth rather than being, too often, places whose crowded and potholed streets and lack
of clean water and other amenities make development unattractive. If India‘s rate of
economic growth is to be sustained and even increased in the face of continuing
economic, political, and environmental uncertainty, much closer attention to reforming
urban policies, encouraging urban initiative, and improving urban outcomes is necessary.
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